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SOCIALBOTS SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS
E. VELA´ZQUEZ, M. YAZDANI, P. SUA´REZ-SERRATO
ABSTRACT. Socialbots, or non-human/algorithmic social media users, have recently been
documented as competing for information dissemination and disruption on online social
networks. Here we investigate the influence of socialbots in Mexican Twitter in regards to
the “Tanhuato” human rights abuse report. We analyze the applicability of the BotOrNot API
to generalize from English to Spanish tweets and propose adaptations for Spanish-speaking
bot detection. We then use text and sentiment analysis to compare the differences between
bot and human tweets. Our analysis shows that bots actually aided in information prolif-
eration among human users. This suggests that taxonomies classifying bots should include
non-adversarial roles as well. Our study contributes to the understanding of different be-
haviors and intentions of automated accounts observed in empirical online social network
data. Since this type of analysis is seldom performed in languages different from English,
the proposed techniques we employ here are also useful for other non-English corpora.
As of 2017, Twitter has over 318 million monthly “active users” [19] - an amount that is
more than population of Indonesia, the 4th most populous country in the world. Advances
in Artificial Intelligence, however, has made it possible to automate the creation of online
social media accounts that attempt to behave similarly to human users. These non-human
accounts are known as socialbots or simply bots. A range of intentions and goals drive the
production and deployment of such bots. Often, socialbots intervene in the discussion of
specific trending topics to potentially manipulate, deceive, and distract human users (for
one review, see [10]).
While there have been numerous studies on the impact and influence of socialbots, most
previous studies have been limited to English Twitter. In this paper we present a case
study to see how social bots are used in Mexican Twitter on a specific trending topic. We
followed over 20 social events in Mexican Twitter in 2016, covering topics ranging from
political scandals, attacks against the media, journalists, expressions of homophobia, to the
banal and trivial. We found that the topic related to the report documenting the violation
of human rights in Tanhuato had far more bot activity than other topics. We therefore
focus our scope of study to tweets related to the #Tanhuato hashtag that was trending in
relation to the release of this report. We now give a brief background of this hashtag and
topic.
Background. As part of the war on drugs on May 22nd, 2015 the Mexican armed forces
raided a ranch in Tanhuato, Michoaca´n. After an extensive investigation, the National
Commission for Human Rights (Comisio´n Nacional de Derechos Humanos CNDH) released
a report on August 18th, 2016. They established that at least 22 civilians were arbitrarily
executed, victims suffered instances of torture, and that the crime scene was tampered
with.
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The report from the CNDH was made available online, and they used their Twitter ac-
count to promote access to it 1. During the following days there was an increased interest
in the topic in Mexican Twitter, using the hashtag #Tanhuato. We collected over 20K
tweets using Twitter’s streaming API between the 19th and 21st of August 2016. These
tweets were processed and the user ID’s evaluated with BotOrNot [7] immediately after
collection2.
We found a substantive presence of socialbots using the #Tanhuato hashtag during the
collection period. According to BotOrNot[7], out of a total of 9,730 unique accounts we
found high bot scores for 1,777 accounts. By following the retweets of the total collection
of users we found an additional 26 bot accounts, giving us a total of 1,803 bots detected.
Given this significant bot activity, we investigate what is the intention behind such bot
accounts and their impact on spreading or stifling information. Since most text and bot
analysis is typically done with English corpora, we also adapt our analysis for tweets in
Spanish.
Unexpectedly, we found from our analysis that in fact most of the bot accounts were
not acting maliciously and were in fact promoting access to the CNDH report. Human
users retweeted the content of the tweets generated by bots, so that access to this report
proliferated through the support of the socialbots and in coordination with the human
users that retweeted them. What was the intention of the bots that we detected using
#Tanhuato ? We shall argue that they were helping to provide access to the report issued
by the CNDH. This type of behavior sets them apart from the typically observed bots that
have spam, or even censorship, intentions [23], [13].
It is important to pause here and notice that in an instance like this it is not a clear
matter whether these bots were benevolent or malignant. It is a matter of perspective.
From the point of view of the Mexican armed forces, these bots are acting against their
honor. From the point of view of the CNDH they are promoting access to a report of
human rights abuse. Our study thus provides an interesting empirical test case for social
bots acting as promoters, as opposed to suppressors, of information.
Previous work. Correlations of content between different accounts has also been used as
a twitter bot detection technique [4]. Tweet sentiment has been studied to discriminate
human from non-human accounts [8]. Other methods combine graph-theoretic, syntactic,
and semantic features to find bots [5]. Another method to identify bots exploits natural
language processing [6]. The possibility of creating a call to arms for activists using Twitter
has been previously explored, and in fact this case study seems to be a variation on this
theme [17]. Numerous other previous works have addressed the issues of detection and
classification of bots, see for example [22, 8, 12, 20, 24, 25, 14, 16, 21, 15, 1, 11, 2].
Most of the mentioned methods and previous results have been developed for English.
By using the language-independent features of BotOrNot [7] it is possible to flag potential
bot accounts in Spanish, and in other languages as well.
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FIGURE 1. Bot versus human activity using #Tanhuato, from streamed
tweets during collection period.
BOT IDENTIFICATION AND DATA PREPARATION
In order to detect bots we use BotOrNot, a general supervised learning system designed
for detecting socialbot accounts on Twitter [7]. It utilizes over 1,000 features such as
user meta-data, social contacts, diffusion networks, content, sentiment, and temporal sig-
natures. Based on evaluation on a large set of labeled accounts, BotOrNot is extremely
accurate in distinguishing bots from humans accounts, with an Area Under the ROC Curve
(AUC) of 94%.
When a twitter account is evaluated in BotOrNot, the output is a JSON file with sev-
eral scores. As we are examining a corpus of tweets in Spanish we focus on language-
independent classifiers, which show a large number of potential bot accounts. Surprisingly,
combining the results of these language-independent classifiers is sufficient for detecting
bots in Spanish. This suggests that simply discarding the language-dependent features
of BotOrNot can yield to non-English bot detection. Further research should be done to
validate the transferability of BotOrNot outside of English Twitter.
We streamed 20,854 tweets from Twitter’s API between 2016-08-19 15:06:17 and 2016-
08-22 02:13:35. These tweets were generated by 9730 different users (see Figures 1 and
6 for the relation between humans and bots), and among them we have 12905 retweets.
When a user (human or bot) generates a tweet, and this tweet can be retweeted by a bot
or a human. Consequently, we find four possibilities: a tweet created by a human and
retweeted by another human (H-H), created by a human and retweeted by a bot (H-B),
created by bot and retweeted by human (B-H) or bot (B-B). In Figure 1 we show the
1Report available at
http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Recomendaciones/ViolacionesGraves/RecVG 004.pdf
2Predecessor of Botometer.
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FIGURE 2. Kernel decomposition estimate for Friend (left) and Network
(right) from Bot-Or-Not, for #Tanhuato, 19-21st August 2016, sample ob-
tained through Twitter’s streaming API.
evolution of #Tanhuato in the collection period. The percentages of accounts that are
humans and those that are bots are shown in Figure 5.
In Figure 3 we show the bi-variate kernel decomposition estimates for pairwise com-
binations of the Friend, Network, and Temporal classifiers form BotOrNot. The regions
towards the upper right hand corner correspond to areas where the bot scores are high. It
can be clearly seen how the bot accounts naturally cluster. The final visualization of this
analysis is presented in Figure 4, where we now compute the kernel density estimate that
incorporates the three classifiers Friend, Network, and Temporal. In this image the smaller
cluster in the upper right corner is the region where the bots accumulate. This 3D image
is formed by taking iso-surfaces obtained from the 3D kernel density estimate. Again, as
in the 2D images, we can separate the bot accounts in a natural way, to isolate them for
further analysis. Notice that these three classifiers are all non-language specific and this
is the reason behind focusing on them instead of on the overall bot score produced by
BotOrNot. Having identified the bots present in our sample, we can now understand how
the appeared over the collection period, as shown in Figure 5.
NETWORK ANALYSIS
54649261 0.0011778193 H
2903265492 0.0006699197 H
3060823412 0.0005209566 H
249005175 0.0004625333 H
1190644922 0.0004146598 H
163552910 0.0002160787 H
222959337 0.0001811033 H
78941875 0.000122997 H
TABLE 1. Table of accounts with highest betweenness-centrality from the full
retweet network. Notice that all of these accounts are from human users.
The third column is labeled H for human and B for bot.
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FIGURE 3. 2D Kernel decomposition estimate for Friend, Network, and Tem-
poral classifiers from Bot-Or-Not, for #Tanhuato, 19-21st August 2016, sam-
ple obtained through Twitter’s streaming API.
FIGURE 4. 3D Kernel decomposition estimate for Friend, Network, and Tem-
poral classifiers from Bot-Or-Not, for #Tanhuato, 19-21st August 2016, sam-
ple obtained through Twitter’s streaming API.
Now that we have performed our bot analysis, we can analyze the bot and human Twit-
ter network. In Figure 7a we see that the nodes with the highest betweenness centrality in
the full retweet network are all human, except for two accounts that belong to bots. These
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FIGURE 5. Percentages of Bot versus human activity using #Tanhuato, from
streamed tweets during the collection period.
FIGURE 6. LEFT: Percentage of different human and bot accounts in col-
lected data. Volume of registered retweets by user type. RIGHT: Clasification
is as follows: humans retweeting humans (H-H), bots retweeting humans.
bot accounts are in fact official news organizations @pictoline and @Pajaropolitico. Thus,
by the betweenness centrality in the retweet network, human users constitute the shortest
paths of dialogue. With the exception of the formal news bots, socialbots are not playing
an active role in the retweet network.
Figure 7b shows the number of retweets by each user (measure of degree in the retweet
network) and that again humans are the more active retweeters. In Figure 6 (DOWN) we
find the relation between these quantities for our data. Furthormore, we observed in the
data that the bots with the highest ammount of retweets among humans were mainly news
organizations: @pictoline, @Pajaropolitico, @emeequis, @CNNEE, and @NewsweekEspanol.
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3243658266 787 B
54649261 754 H
163552910 594 H
84613584 471 B
520653311 438 H
435299501 368 H
35977487 328 H
318799346 212 H
252160277 211 H
1911952410 196 H
44554692 191 H
132346487 156 H
244218738 154 H
832309426182901760 141 H
825966216 140 H
200932969 131 H
18430394 121 H
296592711 119 H
43115590 119 H
190143362 114 H
TABLE 2. Table of accounts with highest betweenness-centrality from the full
retweet network. Notice that only two are marked as bots, @pictoline and
@Pajaropolitico, both of these accounts belong to news organizations. The
third column is labeled H for human and B for bot.
3243658266 768 B
84613584 444 B
52998787 81 B
33884545 71 B
91430932 27 B
358862898 26 B
357050985 20 B
28608099 16 B
104683173 15 B
22721695 11 B
2605229921 9 B
558251048 9 H
93797343 9 B
3122019163 8 B
343452977 8 B
319883780 7 B
3907628182 7 B
2372256601 6 B
266390655 5 B
755873792250023936 4 B
3406088807 4 H
85123108 4 B
4251942192 4 H
TABLE 3. Table showing highest degree nodes in the retweet network. The
third column is labeled H for human and B for bot.
In figure 8 we show the entire retweet network for our collection. It can be seen that
very few bot accounts are responsible for a large proportion of the retweets by humans.
This last point is also clear in figure 10, where only the retweets of bot tweets by humans
are shown. Here the central nodes with high valency are the accounts that were retweeted
most by humans. In contrast figure 9 shows that bots did not actually retweet themselves
much. In fact most bot accounts lie in the outer circle, edgelessly isolated.
The total number of tweets created by bots were 4153, this number represents the
19.9146% of all tweets. In total 12905 of all tweets are retweets. A total of 11895 retweets
were done by humans, and 1010 retweets were done by bots.
The number of tweets created by bots and retweeted by humans is: 1450
The number of tweets created by humans and retweeted by bots is: 848
The number of tweets created by bots and retweeted by bots is: 76
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(A) Retweet network betweenness centrality: the
two bots are news organizations.
(B) Highest degree nodes (raw retweet counts) in
the retweet network.
FIGURE 7. Distribution of centrality of bot and human Twitter accounts. .
We only show the top Twitter accounts.
FIGURE 8. Retweet network for #Tanhuato, bots in red, humans in blue.
Total of 6,528 nodes, and 10,011 edges.
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FIGURE 9. Retweet network for #Tanhuato obtained from our sample, bots
retweeting bots. All edges are shown, most of the nodes in the outer circle
have no connecting edge. This network is composed of 92 nodes, 80 edges.
The number of tweets created by humans and retweeted by humans is: 9896
There are more humans retweeted (10744) than bots retweeted (1526). There is a differ-
ence of 635 retweets: ‘all retweets ’=humans retweeted + bots retweeted + 635
The ‘missing’ 635 retweets belong to tweets created at previous time (before the fist
tweet registe- red). Fortunately, retweets store the info of the original tweet. Searching
the string http in the text of each tweet, we found that 17474 tweets from humans include
web pages, and 4736 tweets from bots include web pages.
TEXT ANALYSIS
We extract bag-of-words features represented as TF-IDF (term frequencyinverse docu-
ment frequency) using [3]. We then used Singular Value Decomposition (SVD, also re-
ferred to as Latent Semantic Indexing in the context of information retrieval and text
mining) to look at the distribution of Tweets on the top singular vectors. While the top
singular vectors capture the most variance in the bag-of-words features set, for this cor-
pora the difference between the bot and human tweets was not clear. We also redid the
9
FIGURE 10. Retweet network for #Tanhuato obtained from our sample, for
only humans retweeting bots. All edges are shown, all of the nodes in the
outer circle have no connecting edge. This network is composed of 1550
nodes, 1596 edges.
analysis by removing Spanish stop words and still did not find any discrimination between
bots and humans.
However, as seen in Figure 11, by computing the log-odds ratio of the counts of words
between the human and bot cohorts (as was done in [18] for discriminating between two
Tweet corpora), we see several terms that are discriminating. Thus, although the bag-of-
words features do not capture strong discrimination between bots and humans, the two
cohorts are clearly different (specific word usages among bots can be different orders of
magnitude since the horizontal axis in Figure 11 is on a log scale).
To better understand the nature of words bots and humans used, we apply basic senti-
ment analysis using LabMT [9]. As discussed in [9], the top 10,000 Spanish words were
presented to Amazon Mechanical Turk where 50 workers rated the happiness of each word
on a scale of 1 to 9 (where 1 is least happy, 9 is most happy, and 5 is neutral). Using these
scores for each word, we compute the average sentiment, havg for the human and bot cor-
pora using Equation 1 in [9]. As discussed in [9] however, a great deal of words may have
neutral sentiment (and are essentially commonly used stop words), and the average senti-
ment score may be biased heavily towards the neutral score of 5.0. Therefore, the authors
suggest removing words that are within ∆havg of 5.0 so that words with stronger sentiment
remain. By selecting an appropriate ∆havg, we can remove stop words in a systematic way
that does not contribute to sentiment.
It is not clear what value to select for ∆havg. While the authors in [9] suggest 0.5 ≤
∆havg ≤ 2.5, here we compute the average sentiment score ∆havg for 0 ≤ ∆havg ≤ 3.0
for a more complete understanding. Figure 12, left panel, shows how the tweets average
sentiment changes as we filter out more neutral words. As the neutral words are filtered,
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FIGURE 11. Most discriminating words between Bots versus humans as com-
puted by likelihood ratios.
we see that the average sentiment is pulled down significantly. This is to be expected as
most tweets are expressing words related to violence. Interestingly, however, the bots seem
to be less emotional than the humans in that their average sentiment is consistently above
humans regardless of what ∆havg value we use.
To investigate this hypothesis further, we removed all retweets and recomputed the
average sentiments. Figure 12, panel on the right, shows again that removing the retweets
does not change the fact that filtering neutral words yields more negative words. However,
we see that the bot sentiment does not correlate strongly with the human tweets. In other
words, as we filter more neutral words, the human tweets become more negative as before.
But the bot tweets remain closer to being neutral. These findings all suggest that the bots
were using less emotionally charged words than humans. In other words, it appears that
the purpose of the bots in this case was to only distribute information in a non-sensational
manner rather than purposefully stir up emotions.
In addition to using LabMT, we also hand coded a list of negative words, extracted from
the corpus of collected tweets, and used it to compare both the bot and human corpora
according to the frequency of appearance of words in this list. In order to increase the
comparability of these words in a wider volume of tweets, when possible, we suppressed
some last letters (that is, we applied “stemming”) such that they could match with different
11
FIGURE 12. Left: Sentiment on Tweets using LabMT. As we filter out neutral
words with the ∆havg, we see that the sentiment from human is significantly
lower than bots. Right: Sentiment on Tweets with retweets removed using
LabMT. Again, as we filter out neutral words with the ∆havg, we see that
the sentiment from human is significantly lower than bots. However, the
correlation between the human and sentiments is much lower when retweets
are removed.
tenses (in case of verbs) and different genders and numbers (in nouns and adjectives)
keeping the connotation. We refer to Table 4 for this list of incomplete words.
To check matches between words in Table 4 and the text in tweets, we remove URLs from
the text in tweets, replace non-ASCII characters (like “n˜ ”, stressed vowel a´,e´,´ı,o´,u´ and “¿
”) by their ASCII equivalent (“n”,a, e, i, o, u,“?”). We also transform all capital letters
to lowercase. The transformed text were split into single words to compare individually.
In order to increase comparison speeds, we group the words alphabetically and compare
only with words starting with the same letter, skipping also words starting with symbols,
numbers. Finally, we only check if the words in Table 4 with the same initial letter as each
word in split message starts with the same letters.
To prevent a misplaced punctuation mark from not matching a word, a second analysis
was performed suppressing the first letter in each word, and checking if this shorter word
matches with Table 4. This analysis also reveals no difference. Our method of comparison
fails when a negative sentiment word is misspelled, but one expects that the sentiment of
the tweet remains congruent in the whole text. Then, if the text is long, we are more likely
to find another negative word but spelled correctly. Conversely, short texts are more likely
to have less misspelled words.
To distinguish what kind of information is most shared, we consider the total of tweets
and assign a numerical value to each one. This value was initialized in 0 increased by a
constant, depending on the number of matches with the Table 4. Assuming that a tweet
has a negative feeling when its value is different to zero, we show in Figure 13 that the
largest volume of tweets comes from retweets with a negative feeling text. A closer reading
of the entire tweet corpus revealed that the most of the messages which are non-negative
12
arma culpable jodid∗ sanguinari∗
asesin∗ delincuen∗ levanton secuestro
asesinat∗ dispara maltrat∗ tortura
bala disparos masacre violacion
balazo ejecucion matanza violenta
brutal ejecut∗ matar
cartel exterminio mentir
castigo fals∗ muerte
corrupcion genocidio pistola
corrupt guerra represion
crimen incendia represiv∗
criminal jode∗ sangriento
TABLE 4. List of negative feeling words (an ∗ is placed when letters can
omitted without changes in connotation.
FIGURE 13. The total volume of twitter texts were comparing with words in
Table 4. LEFT: Tweet classification in Negative and Non-negative. RIGHT
Percentage of negative feeling texts by user type.
cannot be identified as positive or neutral. Their texts share URLs and/or the sentiment
cannot be determined by word inspection.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work we presented a case study of socialbots for a specific trending topic in
Mexican Twitter. While numerous studies have suggested that socialbots act as disrupt-
ing agents of information, in our case study we found the opposite. The socialbots were
in fact enabling the flow of information to ensure that the report about these atrocities
reached the public and information was not stifled. Of course, from the point of the po-
lice authorities the socialbots may be viewed as agents of disruption and it is therefore
a matter of perspective if socialbot are enablers or not. Our case study suggests that the
role and landscape of socialbots is far more complex than simple binary categorizations.
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Our work highlights the need for further research to understand the ethical implications
of such automated social activity.
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